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II.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction lies in this court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(b) (as amended 1988). An order granting permission
for the interlocutory appeal was entered on April 11, 1990.

III.
A.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED

Could authority of a homeowner's daughter to consent
to the police search of a locked crawlspace under the
home

be

inferred

from

the

acts

of

the

homeowner

(Defendant's mother) in giving her daughter a key to the
living area of the home and asking her to bring her some
clothes from the home?
Standard

of

review:

The

scope

of

the

daughter's authority in the home is a factual issue, and
inferences from facts should not be disturbed unless the
inferences are unreasonable or circumscribed by law.
B.

If the police entered without consent, should the
case be remanded for additional fact finding to determine
if reliance by the police on the homeowners daughters
claim

of

authority

was

reasonable

under

all

the

circumstances.
Standard of Review: This is a legal issue in which
no factual findings were made.

This court should defer

to the trial courts ability to determine factual issues.
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of case, course of proceedings.
1

This is an appeal from an order denying Defendants Motion to suppress evidence of a police search and
seizure of defendant's home. Defendant filed an interlocutory
appeal and further prosecution has been stayed in the trial
court pending this appeal.
B.

Statement of Facts.
The Defendant is a 31 year old male living in a
separate bedroom in the home of his 58 year old mother.
(Record, p. 27.)

No one else lives in the home.

Underneath the single story home is a crawlspace used for
storage. Common items are stored in the crawlspace, but
the Defendant controlled its access with a keyed lock
because of his mother's poor health and lack of interest
or ability to enter the crawlspace.

(Record pp. 25, 32)

On August 29, 1989, the Defendant's mother entered
the hospital.

She was taken to the hospital in her own

car by her adult daughter, Michelle Lones, who kept the
car keys.
Michelle

(Record p. 23)

The Defendant's mother asked

Lones to bring her some clothes

mother's home.

(Record pp. 25, 26)

from the

A key to the home

was with the set of car keys.
At the home, Michelle Lones searched the Defendant's
separate bedroom where she found various

items she

believed to be "drug paraphernalia" in a desk drawer.
She did not have keys to the crawlspace, so Mrs. Lones'
husband "kicked in" the door to the crawlspace, breaking
2

the lock.

(Record pp. 7, 19) They entered the space and

found a large covered box containing a fluorescent light
and small plants, which they suspected to be marijuana.
(Record p. 7)
They left the home and Mrs. Lones called the Clinton
City Police and told them that the Defendant was using
drugs in his bedroom and was growing marijuana in the
crawlspace under the home.

She also reported that the

Defendant had gone camping in Montana and would not
return for "two or three days."

(Record p. 9)

Clinton Officer Tom Reynolds contacted an officer
of the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force.

The two

officers met Mr. and Mrs. Lones at the home. Together,
they entered the home where Mrs. Lones showed them the
"drug paraphernalia" in the desk drawer of the Defendant's bedroom, which the officers seized.

(Record p. 6)

The officers then accompanied Mrs. Lones to the
entrance of the crawlspace where they noted that the door
had been forced open.

They entered the crawlspace with

Mrs. Lones where they found a large cardboard box from
which emanated the glow of a fluorescent light. One end
of the box was open slightly.

When one of the officers

leaned down and peered into the end of the box on the
level of the dirt floor, he saw four small potted plants
which he believed to be marijuana.
the plants.

(Record pp 6-7)
3

The officers seized

Neither officer obtained a warrant for the search.
(Record pp. 9, 12)
The Defendant was arrested when he returned home
from his camping trip, and he was charged with possession
of drug paraphernalia and cultivation of marijuana.
The Defendant filed a Motion for Suppression of
Evidence asking for suppression of all evidence obtained
from the home.
Rodney

S.

(Order, addendum "A")

Page, after

hearing

The Honorable

the mother,

ordered

suppression of the items of "paraphernalia" seized from
the Defendant's bedroom, but denied suppression of the
alleged marijuana plants found growing in the box in the
crawlspace of the home.
The Defendant appeals the denial of his Motion to
Suppress Evidence seized from the crawlspace.

V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

No evidence was presented at trial which would support
the court^s conclusion that the homeowner*s adult daughter had
authority to consent to a police search of the locked crawl-space
under the home.

The daughter did not live in the home.

Her

mother*s instructions to bring some clothes from the home to the
hospital do not support an inference that the daughter was charged
with the general care of the home.
the home.

4

The Defendant was caring for

Whatever authority the daughter had did not extend to the
crawlspace under the home which her husband had to force open
because the daughter had no key.
The real issue in the case is whether the officers
reasonably believed the daughter's claim of authority to consent to
a search, that issue is best resolved at the trial level.

VI.
POINT ONE:

ARGUMENT

IT IS UNREASONABLE TO INFER AUTHORITY TO

CONSENT TO A SEARCH OF THE CRAWLSPACE UNDER THE HOUSE FROM THE
HOMEOWNERS REQUEST THAT THE DAUGHTER BRING HER SOME CLOTHES FROM
THE HOME.
A fair assessment of inferences from the facts requires
Appellant to marshall all of those facts upon which the trial court
might have relied in making its inferences.

A,
The

MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE.

homeowner,

Gisseila

Elder,

Defendants

mother,

testified at the hearing concerning the scope of authority she gave
her adult daughter, Michelle Lones. She was the sole witness with
personal knowlege of the daughterxs authority. She was the witness
on whom the court relied in defining the daughter *s scope of authority in the home.

The daughter, Mrs. Lones,

did not testify.
The relevant testimony of Gisseila Elder was:

5

1.

Mrs. Elder entered the hospital on August 29, 1989

(record, p. 20).
2.

Mrs. Elder expected to stay in the hospital only a

few days to rest (record, p. 21).
3.

Defendant, Renee Elder, lived in the home with Mrs.

Elder (record, p. 20).
4.

Mrs. Elder did not ask her daughter to take police

to the home (record, pp. 20,26).
5.

Mrs. Elder knew nothing of marijuana growing in the

crawlspace (record, p. 21).
6.

Mrs. Elder did not give her daughter authority to

enter the locked crawlspace (record p.22).
7.

The daughter had no general power of attorney or

other legal authority over her motherxs affairs (record p. 22).
8.

Mrs. Elder gave her daughter no authority to enter

Defendants bedroom (record p. 22) .
9.

Mrs. Elder allowed her daughter to keep her car keys

after the daughter had driven Mrs. Elder to the hospital in Mrs.
Elder*s car (record, p. 23).
10.

When Mrs. Elder entered the hospital, Defendant was

at work (record, p. 22) .
11.

Defendant went camping over the weekend while Mrs.

Elder was in the hospital (record, p. 23).
12.

Mrs. Elder had access to the crawlspace under her

home, but hadnxt been in it for more than a year (record, p. 25).

6

13.

While in the hospital, Mrs. Elder asked her daughter

to return to the home and bring her some clothes. She had only "a
tee shirt and a pair of....(unintelligible transcript) (record, p. 25, 26).
14.

The daughter did bring Mrs. Elder some clothes just

before Mrs. Elder left the hospital (record, p. 26).
Police officers who observed and participated in the
entry into the home testified that:
15.

The daughter, Mrs. Lones, did have a key to the

living portion of the home (record, p. 6).
16.

The crawlspace door was secured by two deadbolt

locks (record, p.6).
17.

Mrs. Lones

knew the

Defendant

had

locked

the

crawlspace to maintain privacy in it.
18.

Mrs. Lonexs husband had "physically kicked ipen" the

crawlspace door before the officers arrived (record, pp. 7, 19).
19.

Defendant testified that Mrs. Elder and her daughter

did not "get along very well" (record, p. 29).

B.

FINDINGS OF THE COURT

Based on the marshalled evidence, the court entered this
finding:
The court finds that the crawlspace of
the home was a common area used by both
occupants of the home, and the consent of the
Defendants mother to search the crawlspace
7

would be valid.
although the Defendants
mother did not consent to a search of the home
or the crawl space under the home, she gave her
daughter a key ring with car keys and a key to
the living areas of the home, and asked her
daughter to bring her personal items from the
home.
Implied in these facts was the
authority to care for the home and its
contents during Mrs. Elder*s stay in the
hospital.
With such authority, Mrs. Lones
consented to the entry of the police officers
into the crawlspace.
Order and Findings on Defendants Motion for Suppression
of Evidence p. 2 (addendum No.
1).
C.

ARGUMENT

The courtxs inference of a general authority in Mrs.
Lones to "care for the home and contents" is unsupported by the
evidence.

The inferrence is also not a reasonable conclusion and

cannot reasonably be extended to the crawlspace.
Mrs. Elder and the Defendant lived together and cared for
the home together.

When Mrs. Elder entered the hospital, the

Defendant was left to care for the home. There is no evidence that
Mrs. Elder was concerned about the care of her home or that she
knew the Defendant would go camping the next weekend.
Mrs. Elder*s request for Mrs. Lones to bring her some
clothes carried no instructions for the care of the home. As Mrs.
Elder testified

"I only asked her to bring me some clothes"

(record, p. 26).
Neither is there any evidence that Mrs. Lones actually
cared for the home, other than to bring the police to conduct the
search. Even more unreasonable is the inferrence that Mrs. Lones*
8

authority over the home included authority to enter the locked
crawlspace.

Mrs. Elder did not give her the separate key to the

crawlspace or give her any instructions relative to the crawlspace.
Mrs. Lones did not discover the key to the crawlspace in the living
area of the home. To the contrary, she had no key and gained entry
by having her husband kick the door in (record, pp. 7, 9). How
this action could be a logical extensiton of Mrs. Elder*s request
for some clothes is unexplained.

No evidence exists that Mrs.

Lones needed access to the crawlspace under the home in caring for
it during the few days Mrs. Elder was in the hospital.

Surely,

Mrs. Lones needed no access to the crawlspace to find a few items
of Mrs. Elder*s clothing. Mrs. Elder hadn*t been in the crawlspace
for over a year (record, p. 25).

POINT TWO:

A THIRD PARTY^S AUTHORITY TO CONSENT TO A

HOME SEARCH SHOULD BE STRICTLY INTERPRETED.
Unless a search falls within one of the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement, it "is unlawful unless
authority actually exists"

Illinois v. Edward Rodriguez,

U.S.

(1990), 58 U.S.L.W. 4892 (No. 88-2018, decided June 21, 1990)
(copy attached as addendum "B") .

See also: In Interest of I.,

R.L. , 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1989) [waiver only with "actual consent",
quoting (at footnote 3) 68 Am Jur 2d Searches and Seizures, Section
46, "consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but should
be shown by clear and convincing evidence".] This "actual consent"
requirement mandates inquiry into the true intent of the homeowner.
9

If that intent was to allow the third-party limited access rather
than general control over the home, it will not support a consent
search of the home.
In Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964), the U.S.
Supreme Court invalidated a search of a hotel room even though made
with the consent of the desk clerk.

Certainly, the clerk had the

right ot enter the room for hotel purposes, but the search was
invalid.
It is true that the night clerk clearly
and unambiguously consented to the search.
But, there is nothing in the record to
indicate that the police had any basis
whatsoever to believe that the night clerk had
been authorized by the petitioner to permit
the police to search the petitionees room.
Id at p. 489.
The consent of a landlord or hotel or motel manager is
insufficient to justify a warrantless search. See: State vs. Kent,
432 P.2d 64, 20 Utah

2d 1 (Utah 1967).

The right of Mrs. Lones to enter the home for the purpose
of getting Mrs. Elder some clothes for the hospital should be
strictly construed with clear and convincing evidence.

It should

not be broadly construed to allow her to kick in the door of the
crawl space under the home and to invite the police to see the
evidence.

POINT THREE:

THE REAL ISSUE IN THE CASE IS WHETHER THE

POLICE OFFICERS REASONABLY BELIEVED THE HOMEWONER*S DAUGHTER TO
HAVE AUTHORITY TO CONSENT TO THE SEARCH.
10

The officers in this case clearly believed Mrs. Lones to
have authority to consent to the search of the home (e.g. record,
pp. 12, 13).

This may support a new exception to the warrant

requirements under the June 1990 case of Illinois vs. Edward
Rodriguez, supra at 4892. Whether the police believed Mrs. Lonesx
claim is a factual issue.

This new rule was announced after the

ruling and appeal in this case.
POINT FOUR:

THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR A FACTUAL

HEARING ON THE REASONABLENESS OF THE OFFICER* BELIEF IN MRS. LONES*
CONSENT.
Because the Rodriguez case, supra, was decided after this
appeal was taken, neither party has had an opportunity to address
this issue in an evidentiary hearing. The officers will attempt to
support

the

authority.

reasonableness

of

their

belief

in

Mrs. Lones*

The Defendant will present evidence that no urgency

existed (record, p. 17) , that Mrs. Elder was available but never
called (record, p. 17) , that Mrs. Lones * lack of a key to the
crawlspace should have aroused the officers* suspicions, and that
other factors should be weighed in the decision.

A remand to the

trial court is the best resolution of this issue.

VII.

CONCLUSION

This court should reverse the trial courtxs finding of
actual consent for the search of the crawlspace under the home, and
remand the case to the trial court to determine whether the
officersx

belief

in the daughters
11

authority

to consent was

reasonable under the new doctrine of Illinois vs. Edward Rodriguez,
supra, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court since the taking of this
appeal.

^
Respectfully submitted this J -

day of

At^prney ffj6r Defendant/
Appellant
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JACK C. HELGESEN, #1451
LYON, HELGESEN, WATERFALL, & JONES, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant
America First Building
4768 Harrison Blvd.
Oqden, Utah 84403
Telephone (801) 470-4777
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
v.

*
*
*
*

RENEE ELDER,

*

Plaintiff,

ORDER AND FINDINGS ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE

*

Defendant.

*

Case No.

891706570 FS

The Defendant's Motion for Suppression of Evidence
was heard on December 26, 1989 at 1:30 p.m.
was present

The Defendant

and was represented by Jack C. Helqesen.

state was represented
County Attorney.

by

William

McGuire,

the

Deputy Davis

The court heard testimony and considered

the arquments of the parties, and now enters its Order and
Findings.
The

court

finds

that

Defendant

reasonable expectation of privacy in his
the

search

of

the

Defendant's

a

bedroom and that

bedroom

without a search warrant, without the

maintained

was

conducted

Defendant's consent

and in the absence of any other fact justifyinq a warrantless search.
THEREFORE/ the

court

orders

suppression

evidence seized in the Defendant's bedroom.

_ EXHIBIT "A"

_

of all

The
ments

court

that

1)

expectation of

considered

the

also the Defendant's argu-

Defendant

privacy in

maintained

the crawlspace

shared by the Defendant;

2)

the

reasonable

of

privacy

expectation

a

under the home

Defendant
in

maintained a

the

containinq plants alleqed to be marijuana?
of Michelle

reasonable

larqe

box

3) the consent

Lones to the search of the crawlspace was not

valid.
The court
was a
the

finds that

the crawlspace

of the home

common area used by both occupants of the home# and
consent

crawlspace

of

the

would

Defendant's

be

valid.

mother did not consent to a
crawlspace

under

the

home, and

asked her

from the home.
to care

search

of

to

search the

the Defendant's
the

home

or the

she qave her dauqhter a key

key to

the livinq

areas of the

dauqhter to brinq her personal items

Implied in

these facts

was the authority

for the home and its contents durinq Mrs. Elder's

stay in the hospital.
consented

to

crawlspace.
saw the

Althouah

home,

rinq with car keys and a

mother

the

With

entry

such

authority,

Mrs. Lones

of the police officers into the

Having entered

the crawlspace,

the officers

arowina plants in plain view throuqh the open end

of the box.
THEREFORE,
crawlspace of
in the

the

the home

box were

entry

of

the

police

into

the

was lawful and the plants qrowinq

within the
2

plain view

of the officers.

The Defendant's

Motion to

Suppress the Evidence found in

the crawlspace of the home is denied.
The court specifically considered
argument that

officers could not seize the qrowing plants

without a warrant even
through

the

the Defendant's

end

of

though
the

they

box.

growing plants were intended

were

in

plain view

The court finds that the

objects

of

the

search and

their seizure by the officers was lawful.
Dated this

By the Court:

3

/2,*k

day of January, 1990.
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control of the Club's accountants I find this interpretation
of the words 'trade or business" simply "to affront common
understanding and to deny the facts of common experience "
Helvering v Horst, 311 U S 112, 118 (1940) A taxpayer
does not alter the nature of an enterprise by selecting one
reasonable allocation method over another
The Court's decision also departs from the traditional practice of the courts and the IRS Rather than relying on strict
consistency in accounting, the courts long have evaluated
profit motivation according to a variety of factors that indicate whether the taxpayer acted in a manner characteristic of
one engaged in a trade or business See, e g , Teitelbaum
v C I R , 294 F 2d 541, 545 (CA7 1961), Patterson v
United States, 459 F 2d 487, 493-494 (Ct CI 1972), see
Boyle, What is a Trade or Business9, 39 Tax Law 737,
743-745 (1986), Lee, A Blend of Old Wmes m a New Wineskin Section 183 and Beyond, 29 Tax L Review 347, 390-447
(1974) In a regulation based on a wide range of prior court
decisions, the IRS itself has explained § 162 and profit motivation as follows
"Deductions are allowable under section 162 for expenses of carrying on activities which constitute a trade
or busmess of the taxpayer and under section 212 for expenses incurred in connection with activities engaged in
for the production or collection of mcome or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held
for the production of mcome Except as provided in
section 183 and [26 CFR] § 1 183-1 [which authorize individuals and S-corporations to offset hobby losses], no
deductions are allowable for expenses incurred m connection with activities which are not engaged m for
profit
The determination whether an activity is
engaged m for profit is to be made by reference to objective standards, taking into account all of the facts and
circumstances of each case Although a reasonable
expectation of profit is not required, the facts and circumstances must indicate that the taxpayer entered into
the activity, or continued the activity, with the oojective
of making a profit " 26 CFR § 1 183-2(a) (1989)
To facilitate the application of this general standard, the IRS
has supplied a list of nine factors, also based on a wiae body
of case law, for evaluating the taxpayer's profit motive
These factors include (1) the manner in which the taxpayer
carries on the activity, (2) the expertise of the taxpayer or his
advisors, (3) the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in
carrying on the activity, (4) the expectation that assets used
in the activity may appreciate m value, (5) the success of the
taxpayer m carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities,
(6) the taxpaj er's history of income or losses with respect to
the activity, (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, which
are earned, (8) the financial status of the taxpayer, and (9)
the elements of personal pleasure or recreation See id , at
§ 1 183-2(b)(lM9)
The Court today limits this longstanding approach by pinning the profit-motive requirement to the accounting method
that a taxpayer uses to report its ordinary and necessary expenses under § 162(a) Although the tax laws in general
strive to reflect the true economic income of a taxpayer, the
IRS at times allows taxpayers to use accounting methods
that understate their mcome or overstate then* expenses In
this case, as the Court itself acknowledges, the IRS stipulated that the Club could use the gross-to-gross allocation
method to calculate its expenses under § 162(a) even though
this method tends to exaggerate the percentage offixedcosts
attributable to the Club's nonmember sales See ante, at 3,
n 4 Yet, I see no basis for saying that, when the Club
took advantage of this unconditional stipulation, it committed

6-19-90

itself to the legal position that the gross-to-gross method best
reflects economic reality Some mconsistency will exist if
the Club uses the gross-to-gross allocation method in computing the expenses, while usmg some other reasonable accounting method to prove that it undertook the nonmember activity as a trade or business But the solution to this
mconsistency lies m altering the stipulation in other cases,
not m changing the longstanding interpretation of profit
motivation
The precise effect of the Court's holding with respect to the
Club remams unclear The Court states only that the Club
may not offset its losses from nonmember sales against its investment income But I do not understand how the Court
can confine its ruling to investment income alone If the
Club's nonmemlSer activity does not qualify as a trade or
business, then the Club cannot use § 162(a) to deduct any of
the expenses associated with the nonmember activity, not
even to the extent of gross receipts Confronted with this
difficultly at oral argument, respondent stated that, in the
absence of statutory authority, the IRS has allowed an offset
of expenses against gross receipts out of its own "generosity," a characteristic as rare as it is implausible Tr of Oral
Arg 42-43 The IRS, indeed, asserts the authority to disallow the offset in the future See id , at 44 Cf 26 U S C
§183 (authorizing individuals and S-corporations to offset
hobby losses) This possibility further counsels against making the profit-motive requirement more stringent than necessary to determine whether the Club undertook the nonmember activity as a trade or busmess For these reasons, I join
the Court's opinion, with the exception of Parts III-B and
IV, and concur m the judgment
LEONARD J HENZKE JR Washington D C (LEHRFELD
CANTER & HENZKE PC ALLEN B BLSH and MCEWEN
GISVOLD RANKIN & STEWART on the bnets) tor petitioner
CLIFFORD Vf SLOAN Assistant to the Solicitor General (KEN
NETH W STARR Sol Gen SHIRLE\ D PETERSON Asst
\tt\ Gen ROBERT S POMERXNCE ana KENNETH L
GREENE Justice Dent a m s on the briers) lor respondent

No 88-2018

ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v EDWARD RODRIGUEZ
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF
ILLINOIS, FIRST DISTRICT
Syllabus
No 88-2018

Argued March 20 1990-Decided June 21, 1990

Respondent was arrested in his apartment and charged with possession
of illegal drugs, which the police had observed in plain view and seized
The officers did not have an arrest or search warrant, but gained entry
to the apartment with the assistance of Gail Fischer, who represented
that the apartment was 'ourfs]" and that she had clothes and furniture there, unlocked the door with her key, and gave the officers permission to enter The trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress
the seized evidence holding that at the time she consented to the entry
Fischer did not have common authonty because she had moved out of the
apartment The court also rejected the State's contention that, even
if Fischer did not have common authority there was no Fourth Amendment violation if the police reasonably believed at the time of their entry
that she possessed the authority to consent The Appellate Court of
Illinois affirmed
Held
1 The record demonstrates that the State has not satisfied its burden of proving that Fischer had "joint access or control for most purposes" over respondent's apartment, as is required under United States
v Matlock 415 U S 164, 171, n. 7, to establish 'common authonty
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2 A warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third
party whom the police at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to
possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not
(a) Because the Appellate Court's opinion does not contain a "plain
statement" that its decision rests on an adequate and independent state
ground, it is subject to review by this Court See Michigan v Long
463 U S 1032 1040-1042
(b) What respondent is assured by the Fourth Amendment is not
that no government search of his house will occur unless he consents
but that no such search will occur that is 'unreasonable " As with the
many other factual determinations that must regularly be made by government agents in the Fourth Amendment context the ^reasonableness'
of a police determination of consent to enter must be judged not by
whether the police were correct in their assessment but by the objective
standard of whether the facts available at the moment would warrant a
person of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had
authority over the premises If not, then warrantless entry without
further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists But if so
the search is valid Stoner v California 376 U S 483 reconciled
(c) On remand the appellate court must determine whether the police reasonaoiy believed that Fischer had authority to consent to the
entry into respondent's apartment
177 I1L App 3d 1154 550 N E 2d 65 reversed and remanded
SCALIA J , delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST
C J

and WHITE, BLACKMUN

O'CONNOR, and KENNEDY JJ

joined

MARSHALL, J , filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and STEVENS JJ , joined

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court
In United States v Matlock, 415 U S 164 (1974), this
Court reaffirmed that a warrantless entry and search by law
enforcement officers does not violate the Fourth Amendment's proscription of "unreasonaole searches and seizures"
if the officers have obtained the consent of a third party who
possesses common authority over the premises The present case presents an issue we expressly reserved in Matlock,
see id , at 177, n 14 whether a warrantless entry is valid
when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess
common authority over the premises, but who in fact does
not do so
I
Respondent Edward Rodriguez was arrested in his apartment by law enforcement officers and charged with possession of illegal drugs The police gamed entry to the apartment with the consent and assistance of Gail Fischer, who
had lived there with respondent for several months The
relevant facts leading to the arrest are as follows
On July 26,1985, police were summoned to the residence of
Dorothy Jackson on South Wolcott in Chicago They were
met by Ms Jackson's daughter, Gail Fischer, who showed
signs of a severe beating She told the officers that she
had been assaulted by respondent Edward Rodriguez earlier
that day in an apartment on South California Fischer
stated that Rodriguez was then asleep in the apartment, and
she consented to travel there with the police in order to unlock the door with her key so that the officers could enter and
arrest him During this conversation, Fischer several times
referred to the apartment on South California as "our" apartment, and said that she had clothes and furniture there It
is unclear whether she indicated that she currently lived at
the apartment, or only that she used to live there
The police officers drove to the apartment on South California, accompanied by Fischer They did not obtain an arrest warrant for Rodriguez, nor did they seek a search warrant for the apartment At the apartment, Fischer unlocked
the door with her key and gave the officers permission to
enter They moved through the door into the living room,
where they observed in plain view drug paraphernalia and
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containers filled with white powder that they believed correctly, as later analysis showed) to be cocaine The} proceeded to the bedroom, where they found Rodriguez asleep
and discovered additional containers of white powder in two
open attache* cases The officers arrested Rodriguez and
seized the drugs and related paraphernalia
Rodriguez was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver He moved to suppress all evidence seized at the time of his arrest, claiming that Fischer
had vacated the apartment several weeks earlier and had no
authority to consent to the entry The Cook Count} Circuit
Court granted the motion, holding that at the time she consented to the entry Fischer did not have common authority
over the apartment The Court concluded that Fischer was
not a "usual resident" but rather an "infrequent visitor' at
the apartment on South California, based upon its finairgs
that Fischer's name was not on the lease ^hat she did not
contribute to the rent, that she was not allowed to invite others to the apartment on her own, that she did not have access
to the apartment when respondent was aw a>, and that -ne
had moved some of her possessions from 'he apartment
The Circuit Court also rejected the State s contention that,
even if Fischer did not possess common authority over die
premises, there was no Fourth Amendment violation if 'he
police reasonably believed at the time of their entry that Fischer possessed the authority to consent
The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the Circuit Court
m all respects The Illinois Supreme Court denied the
State's Petition for Leave to Appeal, 125 111 2d 572 537
N E 2d 816 (1989), and we granted certiorari 493 U 3
(1989)
The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person's home, whether to make an arrest
or to search for specific objects Payton v New York 445
U S 573 (1980), Johnson v United States 333 U S 10
(1948) The prohibition does not appl\, however to situations in which voluntary consent has been ootained, either
from the individual whose property is searched, see ScnnecKloth v Bustamonte, 412 U S 218 (1973), or from a third
party who possesses common authority over the premises,
see United States v Matlock, supra, at 171 The State of
Illinois contends that that exception applies m the present
case
As we stated in Matlock, 415 U S , at 171 n 7 *[c oramon authority" rests "on mutual use of the property D\
persons generally having joint access or control for most
purposes
" The burden of establishing that common
authority rests upon the State On the basis of this record, it is clear that burden was not sustained The evidence
showed that although Fischer, with her two small children,
had lived with Rodriguez beginning in December 1984, she
had moved out on July 1, 1985, almost a month before rhe
search at issue here, and had gone to live with her motherShe took her and her children's clothing with her, though
leaving behind some furniture and household effects During the period after July 1 she sometimes spent the night at
Rodriguez's apartment, but never invited her friends there,
and never went there herself when he was not home Her
name was not on the lease nor did she contribute to the rent
She had a key to the apartment, which she said at trial she
had taken without Rodriguez's knowledge (though she testified at the prehmmary hearmg that Rodriguez had given her
the key) On these facts the State has not established that.
with respect to the South California apartment, Fischer had
"joint access or control for most purposes " To the contrary,
the Appellate Court's determination of no common authority
over the apartment was obviouslv correct
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III
A
The State contends that, e\en if Fischer did not in fact
have authority to give consent it suffices to validate the
entry that the law enforcement officers reasonably believed
she did Before reaching the merits of that contention, we
must consider a jurisdictional oojection that the decision
below rests on an adequate and mdependent state ground
Respondent asserts that the Illinois Constitution provides
greater protection than is afforded under the Fourth Amendment and tha* tne Appellate Cour relied upon this when it
determined thar a reasonable belief by the police officers w as
insufficient
When a state court decision is clearly based on state law
that is both adequate and mdependent, we will not reuew
tne decision Michiqan\ Long 463 U S 1032 1041(1983)
But w hen ' a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with federal law,"
we require that it contain a " 'plain statement' that [it] rests
upon adequate and independent state grounds," id at 1040,
1042, otherwise "we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the w ay it did
because it believed that federal law required it to do so "
Id at 1041 Here, the Appellate Court's opinion contains
no 'plain statement" that its decision rests on state law
The opinior does not rely on (or even mention) any specific
provision of the Illinois Constitution, nor even the Illinois
Constitution generally Even the Illinois cases cited by the
opinion rely upon no constitutional provisions other than the
Fourth ana Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution We conclude tnat the Appellate Court of Illinois rested it* decision on federal law
B
On the merits of the issue, respondent asserts that permitting a reasonable Delief of common authority to validate an
entry w ould cause a defendant s Fourth Amendment rights
to be ' vicariously waived " Brief for Respondent 32 We
disagree
"ft e have been unyielding m our insistence that a defendant's waiver of his trial rights cannot be given effect unless
it is "knowing and "intelligent " Colorado v Spring, 479
U S 564 574-575 (1987), Johnson v Zerbst, 304 U S 458
(1938) We would assuredly not permit, therefore, evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment to be mtroduced
on the basis of a trial court's mere "reasonable belief "—derived from statements by unauthorized persons—that the
defendant has waived his objection But one must make a
distinction oetween on the one hand trial rights that derive
from the \iolation of constitutional guarantees and, on the
other hand the nature of those constitutional guarantees
themselves As we said m Schneckloth
"There is a vast difference between those rights that
protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed
under the Fourth Amendment Nothing, either in the
purposes behind requiring a 'knowing' and 'intelligent'
waiver of trial rights, or m the practical application
of such a requirement suggests that it ought to be extended to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures " 412 U S , at 241
What Rodriguez is assured by the trial right of the exclusionary rule, where it applies, is that no evidence seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment will be mtroduced
at his trial unless he consents What he is assured by the
Fourth Amendment itself, however, is not that no government search of his house will occur unless he consents, but
that no sucn search will occur that is "unreasonable " U S
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Const, Amdt 4 There are various elements, of course,
that can make a search of a person s house ' reasonable"—one
of w hich is the consent of the person or his cotenant The
essence of respondent's argument is that we should impose
upon this element a requirement that we have not imposed
upon other elements that regularly compel government officers to exercise judgment regarding the facts namely, the
requirement that their judgment be not only responsible but
correct
The fundamental objective that alone validates all unconsented government searches is, of course, the seizure of
persons who have committed or are about to commit crimes,
or of evidence related to crimes But "reasonableness," with
respect to this necessary element, does not demand that the
government be factually correct m its assessment that that is
what a search will produce Warrants need only be supported by "probable cause," wnich demands no more than
a proper "assessment of prooabilities in particular factual
contexts
" Illinois v Gates, 462 U S 213 232 (1983)
If a magistrate, cased upon seemingly reliable but factually
maccurate information, issues a warrant for the search of
a house m which the sought-after felon is not present, has
never been present and was never likely to nave been present the owner of that house suffers one of the inconveniences
we all expose ourselves to as the cost of living in a safe society, he does not suffer a violation of the Fourth Amendment
Another element often, though not m\ ariaoly required m
order to render an unconsented search "reasonable" is, of
course, that the officer be authorized oy a valid warrant
Here also we have not held that "reasonableness' precludes
error with respect to those factual judgments that law enforcement officials are expected to make In Maryland \
Garrison, 480 U S 79 (1987), a warrant supported by probable cause with respect to one apartment wTas erroneously issued for an entire floor that was divided (though not clearly)
mto two apartments We upheld the search of the apartment not properly covered by the warrant We said
"[T]he validity of the search of respondent's apartment
pursuant to a warrant authorizing the searcn of the entire thirdfloordepends on whether the officers' failure to
realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively
understandable and reasonable Here it unquestionably
was The objective facts available to the officers at the
time suggested no distinction between [the suspect's]
apartment and the third-floor premises " Id at 88
The ordinary requirement of a warrant is sometimes supplanted by other elements that render the unconsented
search "reasonable " Here also we have not held that the
Fourth Amendment requires factual accuracy A warrant is
not needed, for example, where the search is mcident to an
arrest In Hill v California, 401 U S 797 (1971), we upheld a search mcident to an arrest, even though the arrest
was made of the wrong person We said
"The upshot was that the officers in good faith believed Miller was Hill and arrested him They were
quite wrong as it turned out, and subjective good-faith
belief would not in itself justify either the arrest or the
subsequent search But sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment and on the record before us the officers' mistake was understandable and the arrest a reasonable response to the situation facing them at the
time " Id , at 803-804
It would be superfluous to multiply these examples It is
apparent that m order to satisfy the "reasonableness" re-
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quirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government—whether the
magistrate issuing a warrant, the police officer executing a
warrant, or the police officer conducting a search or seizure
under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement—is
not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable As we put it m Bnnegar v United States, 338
U S 160, 176 (1949)
"Because many situations which confront officers in the
course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their
part But the mistakes must be those of reasonable
men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions
of probability "
We see no reason to depart from this general rule with respect to facts bearing upon the authority to consent to a
search Whether the basis for such authority exists is the
sort of recurring factual question to which law enforcement
officials must be expected to apply their judgment, and all
the Fourth Amendment requires is that they answer it reasonably The Constitution is no more violated when officers
enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though
erroneously) believe that the person who has consented to
their entry is a resident of the premises, than it is violated
when they enter without a warrant because they reasonably
(though erroneously) believe they are in pursuit of a violent
felon who is about to escape See Archibald v Mosel, 677 F
2d 5 (CA1 1982) *
Stoner v California, 376 U S 483 (1964) is in our view not
to the contrary There, in holding that police had improperly entered the defendant's hotel room based on the consent
of a hotel clerk, we stated that "the rights protected oy the
Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded
by unrealistic
doctrines of 'apparent authority '" Id , at 488 It is ambiguous, of course, whether the word "unrealistic" is descriptive
or limiting—that is, whether we were condemning as unrealistic all reliance upon apparent authority, or whether we
were condemnmg only such reliance upon apparent authority
as is unrealistic Similarly ambiguous is the opinion's earlier
statement that "there [is no] substance to the claim that the
search was reasonable because the police, relying UDon the
night clerk's expressions of consent, had a reasonaole basis
for the belief that the clerk had authority to consent to the
search " Ibid Was there no substance to it because it
failed as a matter of law, or because the facts could not
possibly support it0 At one point the opinion does seem to
speak clearly
"It is important to bear m mind that it was the petitioner's constitutional right which was at stake here, and
* JUSTICE MARSHALL S dissent rests upon a rejection of the proposition
that searcnes pursuant to valid third-partv consent are generally reasonable ' Post at " Oniv a warrant or exigent circumstances he contends
can produce 'reasonableness' consent validates *he search oniv because
the object of the search thereby 1iimt[sj his expectation of privac post
at 10, so that the search becomes not really a search at alL We see no
basis for making such an artificial distinction. To describe a consented
search as a non-invasion of privacy and thus a non-search is strange in the
extreme And while it must be admitted that this ingenious device can
explain why consented searches are lawful, it cannot explain whv seemingly consented searches are "unreasonable," which is all that the Constitution forbids See Delaunre v Prouse 440 U S 648, 653-654 (1979)
("[t]he essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is
to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by
government officials') The only basis for contending that the constitutional standard could not possibly have been met here is the argument thar
reasonableness must be judged by the facts as they were rather than by
the facts as they were known As we have discussed in text that argument has long since been rejected
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not the night clerk's nor the hotel's It was a right,
therefore, which only the petitioner could waive by word
or deed, either directly or through an agent " Id , at
489
But as we have discussed, what is at issue when a claim of
apparent consent is raised is not whether the right to be free
of searches has been waived, but whether the right to be free
of unrea$07iable searches has been violated Even if one
does not think the Sterner opinion had this subtlet\ m mind,
the supposed clarity of its foregoing statement is immediately
compromised, as follows
"It is true that the night clerk clearly and unambiguous^
consented to the search But there is nothing in the
record to indicate that the police had any basis whatsoever to believe that the night clerk had been authorized
by the petitioner to permit the police to search the petitioner's room " Ibid (emphasis added)
The italicized language should have oeen deleted, of course
if the statement two sentences earlier meant that an appearance of authority could never validate a search In the last
analysis, one must admit that the rationale of Stoner was
ambiguous—and perhaps deliberately so It is at least a reasonable reading of the case, and perhaps a preferable one,
that the police could not rely upon the obtained consent because they knew it came from a hotel clerk, knew that the
room was rented and exclusively occupied by the defendant
and could not reasonably have believed that the former had
general access to or control over the latter Similarly ambiguous in its implications (the Court's opinion does not ev en
allude to, much less discuss the effects of, "reasonable belief") is Chapman v United States, 365 U S 610 (1961) In
sum, we were correct m Matlock, 415 U S , at 177 n 14
when we regarded the present issue as unresolved
As Stoner demonstrates, what we hold today does not suggest that law enforcement officers may always accept a person's invitation to enter premises Even when the invitation
is accompanied by an explicit assertion that the person lives
there, the surrounding circumstances could conceivably be
such that a reasonable person would doubt its truth and not
act upon it without further inquiry As with other factual
determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determination of consent to enter must "be judged agamst an objective
standard would the facts availaDle to the officer at the moment
'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief "
that the consenting party had authority over the premises9
Terry v Ohio, 392 U S 1, 21-22 (1968) If not, then warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists But if so, the search is valid
#
* *
In the present case, the Appellate Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the officers reasonably believed
that Fischer had the authority to consent because it ruled as
a matter of law that a reasonaole belief could not validate the
entry Smce wefindthat ruling to be m error, we remand
for consideration of that question The judgment of the Illinois Appellate Court is reversed and remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion
So ordered
JUSTICE MAPSHALL, with whom JLSTICE B R E ^ W N and
JUSTICE STE\ENS join, dissenting

Dorothy Jackson summoned police officers to her house to
report that her daughter Gail Fischer had oeen b^afcen Fischer told police that Ed Rodriguez her boyfriend, was he>
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assaulter. During an interview with Fischer, one of the officers asked if Rodriguez dealt in narcotics. Fischer did not
respond. Fischer did agree, however, to the officers' request to let them into Rodriguez's apartment so that they
couid arrest him for battery. The police, without a warrant
and despite the absence of an exigency, entered Rodriguez's
home to arrest him. As a result of their entry, the police
discovered narcotics that the State subsequently sought to
introduce in a drug prosecution against Rodriguez.
The majority agrees with the Illinois appellate court's
determination that Fischer did not have authority to consent
to the officers' entry of Rodriguez's apartment. Ante, at 4.
The Court holds that the warrantless entry into Rodriguez's
home was nonetheless valid if the officers reasonably believed that Fischer had authority to consent. Ante, at 11.
The majority's defense of this position rests on a misconception of the basis for third-party consent searches. That such
searches do not give rise to claims of constitutional violations
rests not on the premise that they are ''reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment, see ante, at 6, but on the premise that a
person may voluntarily limit his expectation of privacy by allowing others to exercise authority over his possessions. Cf.
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S* 347, 351* (1967) ("What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection").
Thus, an individual's decision to permit another "joint access
[to] or control [over the property] for most purposes,"
United States v. Matlock, 415 U. S. 164, 171, n. 7 (1974). limits that individual's reasonable expectation of privacy and to
that extent limits his Fourth Amendment protections. Cf.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 14S (1978) (because passenger in car lacked "legitimate expectation of privacy in the
glove compartment." Court did not decide whether search
would violate Fourth Amendment rights of someone who had
such expectation). If an individual has not so limited his
expectation of privacy, the police may not dispense with the
safeguards established by the Fourth Amendment.
The baseline for the reasonableness of a search or seizure
in the home is the presence of a warrant. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assn., 489 U. S.
(1989). Indeed, "searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant
are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445
U. S. 573, 586 (1980). Exceptions to the warrant requirement must therefore serve "compelling" law enforcement
goais. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385. 394 (1978). Because the sole law enforcement purpose underlying thirdparty consent searches is avoiding the inconvenience of securing a warrant, a departure from the warrant requirement
is not justified simpiy because an officer reasonably believes
a third party has consented to a search of the defendant's
home. In holding otherwise, the majority ignores our longstanding view that "the informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates . . . as to what searches and seizures are
permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over
the hurried action of officers and others who may happen to
make arrests." United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452,
464 (1932).
I
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . shall not be vioated." We have recognized that the "physical entry of the
icme is the chief evil against which the wording of the
r
ourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United
fates District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972). We have
irther held that "a search or seizure carried out on a susect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, un-
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less the police can show that it falls within one of a carefully
defined set of exceptions." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U. S. 443, 474 (1971). Those exceptions must be crafted in
light of the warrant requirement's purposes. As this Court
stated in McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948):
"The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth
Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the
citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh
the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the
law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to
entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals." Id., at
455-456.
The Court has tolerated departures from the warrant
requirement only when an exigency makes a warrantless
search imperative to the safety of the police and of the community. See. e. g., id., at 456, ('We cannot be true to that
constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a
search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of
the situation made that course imperative"); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Chime! v. California,
395 U. S. 752 (1969) (interest in officers' safety justifies
search incident to an arrest); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S.
499, 509 (1978) ("compelling need for official action and no
time to secure a warrant" justifies warrantless entry of burning building). The Court has often heard, and steadfastly
rejected, the invitation to carve out further exceptions to the
warrant requirement for searches of the home because of the
burdens on police investigation and prosecution of crime.
Our rejection of such claims is not due to a lack of appreciation of the difficulty and importance of effective law enforcement, but rather to our firm commitment to "the view of
those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the
name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal
law." Mincey, supra, at 393 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1. 6-11 (1977)).
In the absence of an exigency, then, warrantless home
searches and seizures are unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. The weighty constitutional interest in preventing unauthorized intrusions into the home overrides any
law enforcement interest in relying on the reasonable but potentially mistaken belief that a third party has authority to
consent to such a search or seizure. Indeed, as the present
case illustrates, only the minimal interest in avoiding the inconvenience of obtaining a warrant weighs in on the law enforcement side.
Against this law enforcement interest in expediting arrests
is "the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961). To be sure,
in some cases in which police officers reasonably rely on a
third party's consent, the consent will prove valid, no intrusion will result, and the police will have been spared the inconvenience of securing a warrant. But in other cases, such
as this one, the authority claimed by the third party will be
false. The reasonableness of police conduct must be measured in light of the possibility that the target has not consented. Where "[n]o reason is offered for not obtaining a
search warrant except the inconvenience to the officers and
some slight delay necessary to prepare papers and present
the evidence to a magistrate," the Constitution demands that
the warrant procedure be observed. Johnson v. United
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States, 333 U S 10, 15 (1948) The concerns of expediting
police work and avoiding paperwork "are never very convincing reasons and, m these circumstances, certainly are not
enough to by-pass the constitutional requirement " Ibid
In this case, as m Johnson, "[n]o suspect wasfleeingor likely
to take flight. The search was of permanent premises, not of
a movable vehicle No evidence or contraband was threatened with removal or destruction
If the officers in this
case were excused from their constitutional duty of presenting their evidence to a magistrate, it is difficult to think of a
case m which it should be required " Ibid
Unlike searches conducted pursuant to the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement, see supra^ at
, third-party consent searches are not based on an
exigency and therefore serve no compelling social goal Police officers, when faced with the cnoice of relying on consent
by a third party or securmg a warrant, should secure a warrant, and must therefore accept the risk of error should they
instead choose to rely on consent.
II
Our prior cases discussing searches based on third-party
consent have never suggested that such searches are "reasonable " In United States v Matlock, this Court upheld a
warrantless search conducted pursuant to the consent of a
third party who was living with the defendant The Court
rejected the defendant's challenge to the search, stating that
a person who permits others to have "joint access or control
for most purposes
assume[s] the risk that [such persons]
mignt permit the common area to oe searched " 415 U S ,
at 171. n 7, see also Frazier v Cupp, 394 U S 731. 740
(1969) (holding that defendant who left a duffel bag at another's house and allowed joint use of the bag "assumed the risk
that [the person] would allow someone else to look inside')
As the Court's assumption-of-nsk analysis makes clear,
third-party consent limits a person s ability to challenge the
reasonaoleness of the search only because that person voluntarily has relinquished some of his expectation of privacy by
sharing access or control over his property with another
person.
A search conducted pursuant to an officer s reasonaole but
mistaken belief that a third party had authority to consent is
thus on an entirely different constitutional footing from one
oased on the consent of a third party who in fact has such authority Even if the officers reasonably believed that Fischer had authority to consent, she did not, and Rodriguez's
expectation of privacy was therefore undiminished Rodriguez accordingly can challenge the warrantless intrusion into
his home as a violation of the Fourth Amendment This conclusion flows directly from Stoner v California, 376 U. S
483 (1964) There, the Court required the suppression of evidence seized m reliance on a hotel clerk's consent to a warrantless search of a guest's room. The Court reasoned that
the guest's right to be free of unwarranted intrusion "was a
right.
which only [he] could waive by word or deed, either
directly or through an agent " Id , at 489 Accordingly,
the Court rejected resort to "unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent authority'" as a means of upholding the search to which
the guest had not consented. Id , at 488 *
'The majority insists that the rationale of Stoner is "ambieuous—and
perhaps deliberately so" with respect to the permissibility of third-party
searches where the suspect has not conferred actual authority on the third
party Ante, at 9 Stoner itself is clear, however; today's majority manufactures the ambiguity When the Stoner Court stated that the Fourth
Amendment is to not to be eroded "by unrealistic doctrines of apparent
authority,'" 376 U S at 488, and that "only the petitioner could waive by
word or deed" his freedom from a warrantless search id , at -489, the Court
rejected precisely the proposition that the majority today adopts
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III
Acknowledging that the third party in this case lacked authority to consent, the majority seeks to rely on cases suggesting that reasonable but mistaken factual judgments by
police will not invalidate otherwise reasonable searches
The majority reads these cases as establishing a "general
rule" that "what is generally demanded of the many factual
determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the
government—whether the magistrate issuing a warrant, the
police officer executing a warrant, or the police officer conducting a search or seizure under one of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement—is not that they always oe correct, out
that they always be reasonable " Ante, at 8
The majority's assertion, however, is premised on the erroneous assumption that third-party consent searches are generally reasonable The cases the majority cites thus provide
no support for its holding In Bnnegar v United States, 338
U S. 160 (1949), for example, the Court confirmed the unremarkable proposition that police need only probable cause,
not absolute certainty, to justify the arrest of a suspect on a
highway As Bnnegar makes clear, the possibility of factual
error is built into the probable cause standard, and such a
standard, by its very definition, will m some cases result in
the arrest of a suspect who has not actually committed a
crime. Because probable cause defines the reasonableness
of searches and seizures outside of the home, a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment whenever that standard is met, notwithstanding the possibility of "mistakes" on
the part of police Id , at 176 In contrast, our cases have
already struck the oalance against warrantless home intrusions in the absence of an exigency See supra, at
Because reasonable factual errors oy law enforcement officers wall not validate unreasonable searches, the reasonaoleness of the officer s mistaken belief that the third part} had
authority to consent is irrelevant:
The majority regards Stoner's rejection of "unrealistic doctrines of apparent authority"' as amoiguous on the theory that tne Court mignt ha\e
been reiernng only to unreasonable applications oi such doctrines, ana not
to the doctrines themselves Ante, at 9-10 But Stoners express description of apparent authority doctrines as unrealistic cannot be viewed as
mere happenstance The Court in fact used the word 'applications' JI the
same sentence to refer to misapplications of the actual authontv doctrine
"Our decisions make clear that the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded oy strained applications oi the law of agencv or
by unrealistic doctrines of apparent authority '" 376 U S , at 4SS iemphasis added) The full sentence thus unambiguously confirms that Stoner
rejected anv reliance on apparent authority doctrines
Nor did the Stoner Court leave open the door for a police officer to rely
on a reasonable but mistaken oeiief in a third party's authority to consent
when it remarked that "there is nothing in the record to indicate that -he
police had any Dasis wnatsoever to believe that the night clerk had been
authorized by the petitioner to permit the police to search the petitioner s
room " Id , at 489 Stating that a defendant must "by word or deed"
waive his rights ibid is not inconsistent with noting that in a particular
case, the aosence of actual waiver is confirmed by the police s inabUit} to
identify any oasis for their contention that waiver had indeed occurred
'The same analysis applies to Hill v California 401 U S T97 U971)
where the Court upheld a search incident to an arrest in which officers reasonaoly but mistakenly oelieved that the person arrested in the defendant's home was the defendant The Court refused to disturb the state
court's holding that " '[wjhen the police have prooaole cause to arrest one
party, and when they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party,
then the arrest of the second party is a valid arrest'" Id , at 802 (brackets in original) (quoting People v Hill, 69 Cal 2d 550, 553, 446 P 2d 521
523 (1968)) Given that the Court decided Hill before the extension of the
warrant requirement to arrests in the home, Payton v Neu York, 445
U S 573 (1980), Hill »nould be understood no less than Bnnegar as simply
a gloss on the meaning of "probaole cause " The holding in Hill rested on
the fact that the police had prooable cause to believe that Hill had committed a crime In such circumstances the reasonableness of the arrest for
which the police had prooable cause was not undermined by the officers'
factual mistake regarding the identity of the person arrested
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The majority's rebance on Maryland v Go'n-ison, 480
U S 79 (1987), is also misplaced In Garrison, the police
oDtamed a valid warrant for the search of the "third floor
apartment" of a building whose thirdfloorin fact housed two
apartments Id , at 80 Although the police had probable
cause to search onlj one of the apartments, they entered both
apartments because "[t]he objective facts available to the officers at the time suggested no distinction between [the
apartment for which they legitimately had the warrant and
the entire thirdfloor]" Id , at 88 The Court held that the
officers reasonable mistake of fact did not render the search
unconstitutional
Id , at 88-89 As in Bnnegar, the
Court s decision was premised on the general reasonableness
of the type of police action involved Because searches
Dased on warrants are generalh reasonable, the officers' reasonable mistake of fact did not render their search "unreasonaole ' Tnis reasoning is evident m the Court's conclusion
that little would be gained by adoptmg additional burdens
* over and aoove the bedrock requirement that, with the exceptions we have traced in our cases, the police may conduct
searches onh pursuant to a reasonably detailed warrant "
Garrison, supra, at 89, n 14
Garrison, like Bnnegar, thus tells us nothing about the
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment of a warrantless arrest m the home based on an officer's reasonable but
mistaken oelief that the third party consenting to the arrest
^ as empott ered to do so The majority's glib assertion that
"[i]t would be superfluous to multiply" its citations to cases
like Bnnegar Hill, and Garrison, ante, at 8, is thus correct,
out for a reason entirely different than the majority suggests Those cases provide no illumination of the issue
raised in tnis case, and further citation to like cases would be
as superfluous as the discussion on uhich the majority's conclusion presentlj depends
IV
Our case* demonstrate that third-party consent searches
are free from constitutional challenge only to the extent that
the} rest on consent by a party empowered to do so The
majority's conclusion to the contran ignores the legitimate
expectations of privacy on which individuals are entitled to
rel> That a person who allows another joint access over his
property thereby limits his expectation of privacy does not
justify trampling the rights of a person who has not similarly
relinquished any of his privacy expectation
Instead of judging the. validity of consent searches, as we
have m the past, based on whether a defendant has m fact
limited his expectation of privacy, the Court today carves out
an additional exception to the warrant requirement for thirdpart} consent searches without pausing to consider whether
" 'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment," Mincey,
437 U S , at 394 (citations omitted) Where this free-floatng creation of "reasonable" exceptions to the warrant requirement will end, now that the Court has departed from
he balancing approach that has long been part of our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, is unclear But by allowing a
>erson to be subjected to a warrantless search m his home
nth out his consent and without exigency, the majority has
aken away some of the liberty that the Fourth Amendment
T
as designed to protect
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The respondent—an investor owned public utihn operating in the petitioner States—and other utilities and natural gas purchasers filed suit in
the District Court against a pipeline compam and five gas producers
under § 4 of the Clavton Act which authorizes an\ person injured b\ a
violation of the antitrust laws to sue for treble damages The utilities
alleged that the defendants had unlawfully conspired to inflate the price
of gas that they supplied to the utilities and sought treDle damages for
both the amount overcharged and the decrease in sales to customers
caused b\ the overcharge The petitionee States filed separate § 4 actions in the District Court against the same defendants for the alleged
antitrust violation asserting inter aim parens patriae claims on behalf
of all natural persons residing in the States v»ho had purchased gas from
an\ utility at inflated prices The court consolidated all of the actions
and granted the utilities partial summary judgmen* with respect to the
defendants defense that since the utilities had passed through all of the
alleged overcharge to their customers, the utilities lacked standing because thev had suffered no antitrust injury as required D\ § 4 In light
of its conclusion that, under Hanover Shoe Inc \ Lnxted Shoe Machin
ery Corp 392 U S 481 and Illinois Brick Co \ Illinois 431 U S
720 the utilities had suffered antitrust injury as direct purcnasers out
their customers as indirect purchasers, had not the court dismissed the
States parens patriae claims The Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissals
Held When suppliers violate antitrust laws b\ overcharging a public utility for natural gas and the utilm passes on the overcharge to its customers onlv the utility has a cause of action under § 4 because it alone
has suffered antitrust injury
1 Three rationales underlie the indirect purchaser rule adopted in
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick (1) establishing the amount of an overcharge shifted to indirect purchasers would normally prove insurmountable m light of the wide range of considerations influencing a company's
pricing decisions (2) a pass-on defense would reduce the effectiveness of
§ 4 actions by diminishing the recovery available to any potential plaintiff and (3) allowing suits by indirect purchasers would risk multiple liability because the alleged antitrust violators could not use a pass-on defense in an action by the direct purchasers
2 The aforesaid rationales compel the conclusion that no exception to
the indirect purchaser rule should be made for suits involving regulated
public utilities that^ass on all of their costs to their customers
(a) Allowing indirect suits m such cases might necessitate complex
cost apportionment calculations, since a utility bears at least some portion of a passed-on overcharge to the extent that it could have sought
and gained state permission to raise its rates in the absence of the overcharge, cf Hanover Shoe supra at 493, and n 9, and since various factors, such as the need to seek regulatory approval, may delav the passing on process and thereby require the utility, in the interim to bear
some of the overcharge s costs m the form of lower earnings Here, the
certified question leaves unclear whether the respondent could have
raised its pnces prior to the overcharge, whether it had passed on "most
or all" of its costs at the time of its suit, and even the means by which the
pass through occurred Proof of these preliminary issues, which are irrelevant to the defendants liability, would turn upon the intricacies of
state law, and, if it were determined that respondent had borne some of
the costs would require the adoption of an apportionment formula, the
very complexity that Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick sought to avoid
Moreover creating an exception in such cases would make little sense

